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ABSTRACT
Shelley* seems to Base his system of morals most closely on that of
the British empiricists, and, especially, Hume,

He derives his concept

of the imagination from Hume and its role plays a major importance in
Shelley.

Shelley regards the imagination as superior to the reason, for

it is the Basis of all knowledge.

As it is the correlating power between

man and the universe, its creations, which Shelley calls, in whatever
form, poetry, are a reflection of the influence of nature or society on
man*s mind.

The reason only distinguishes between ideas created by the

imagination in order to determine those which can be made useful.
Evil for Shelley is largely subjective in nature and results from
many's failure to cultivate his imagination in order to regulate his re
lations w i t h his fellow men, the realm of morals.

The man who has fa

miliarized himself with the good which exists in thought, action and
persons not his own has a vast associative response in his unconscious.
The imagination, which comfnands the unconscious, instinctively adjusts
his thoughts to present events,

The reason, which is a conscious power

has a limited view and less efficiently fits means to ends.
The Defence states that "without an intermixture of the poetical
element

. , , [evil]

, . , must ever flow from the unmitigated exercise

of the reason" (VII, p, 356),

Systems, whether civil, religious, scien

tific, or economic in nature, imposed upon man by reasoners without
scrutiny of the effects, may destroy man^s sensibility.

Only the ima-^

gination, cultivated by an habitual perception of the consequences of
actions, can accommodate calculations of the reason to man's inner
ii
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nature.

Evil may be said to result from an imagination gap in man's

moral reasoning.
Man cultivates his imagination by empathy, putting himself in the
place of others.
come his own.

The thoughts and feelings of his fellow men must b e 

Love acts to cultivate the imagination, for it is a

"going out of our own nature, and an identification of ourselves with the
beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own"(De
fence , VII, p. 118).

It is only when man's sympathies have been enlarged

to an affinity with those of all mankind, both in the present and the
past, that he rises above the temporal order, the realm of reason.

Then

j

the creations of his imagination partake of the eternal and the universal.
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INTRODUCTION

An inquiry into Shelley's theory of evil requires some investigation
of his system of philosophy.

For this purpose, I intend to deal mainly

with his prose for its more explicit statement of his ideas.
most relevant to my problem is A Defence of P o e t r y .
of 1821,

The essay

Written in the spring

it is Shelley's last major prose work and contains the maturest

expression in prose of his philosophy.

Of the earlier works I wish to

deal' primarily with "Speculations on Morals," "Speculations on Metaphy
sics" and "On the Punishment of Death," as they are concerned more
specifically with my problem.

I am confining discussion of Shelley's

poetry to Prometheus Unbound and "Ode to Liberty," and I refer to them
mainly to exemplify some of my thesis statements.
Most of the critical writings on Shelley indicate inconsistency in
his thought due to the fact that he is generally considered wholly
Platonic.

Viewing Shelley's earlier works from the vantage point of the

Defence, however, reveals that his system makes up a coherent whole,

for

the ideas in the Defence are found in nascent form in the earlier prose.
The evidence of these writings also shows that Shelley owes much to em
piricism, the main current of thought in his day.

These, perhaps, are

the most significant discoveries of my work and, taken in view of
typical Shelley criticism, quite radical.

But recent critics of Shelley

also find consistency and a debt to empiricism and advocate the reading
of Shelley's prose as a key to his thought.'*'

1 Some of these critics and their works are:

David Lee Clark,

1
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Evil and its cause are a prominent concern in Shelley's work.

Con

sidering the times in which he wrote, we -can appreciate why, for most of
his work falls between 1813 and 1822, a period of war, oppression, and
severe economic conditions in Europe and England.

Many events, whether

they were a sign of hope or an act of tyranny, would spur Shelley to
write, the Peterloo Massacre and the 1820 revolution in Spain inspiring
respectively,

"The Masque of Anarchy" and "Ode to Liberty."

As a result,

many of his works either cry out against tyranny or herald some occurrence
which signals the revival of freedom.
In times of unrest it is natural to look for some cause in the hope
that its eradication will bring about a change.

This is the role that

Shelley assigns to the poet:
Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration;
the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon
the present; the words which express what they understand not;
the trumpets which sing to battle, and feel not what £hey
inspire; the influence which is moved not, but moves.
It is with this attitude that Shelley turns towards the problems of the
world.
Shelley believes that evil takes two forms, one subjective in nature,
and the other objective.

Objective evil, including earthquakes, disease,

mutability and death, is part of the natural order of existence.

Man

eventually may alleviate the effects of many of these evils, although
in Prometheus U n b o u n d , even after Jupiter's fall and the return of love

Shelley's P r o s e : The Trumpet of a Prophecy, 1954; Earl Wasserman, Prome
theus U n b o u n d , 1965; C.E. Pulos, The Deep T r u t h : A Study of Shelley's
Skepticism, 1954; Donald H. Reiman, Shelley's "The Triumph of L i f e " : A
Critical Stu d y , 1965.
2 Percy Bysshe- Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, The Complete Works of
Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck, 10 v o l s . (New
York, 1965)^ VII, p. 140.
All quotations from Shelley's works, unless
otherwise noted, are from this edition.
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have effected m a n ’s regeneration, he is still subject to "chance, and
death, and mutability"

(III, iv, 1. 201).

Subjective evil is largely of man's own making.

Queen Mab tells us

that "Han . . . fabricates/ The sword which stabs his peace"

(III, 11.

3
199-200).

Because of its nature, subjective evil would seem easily

removed, prompting Shelley, who wonders why man acquiesces in his condi
tion to cry out frequently against the tyranny of kings, priests and
■i'

government, as in this passage from The Revolt of Isl a m :
'This need not be; ye might arise, and will
That gold should lose its power, and thrones their glory;
That love, which none may bind, be free to fill
The world, like light; and evil faith, grown hoary
With crime, be quenched and die . . .
Dungeons and palaces are transitory—
High temples fade like vapour— man alone
Remains, whose will has power when all beside is go n e . 1,
(VIII, x v i , 11. 3334-42)
Since Shelley feels that subjective evil can be removed by man, his
(

primary concern with this aspect of the problem of evil forms the focus
of my paper.
A concern with subjective evil necessitates an understanding of man.
Shelley considers that philosophers who are subjective, use inductive
reasoning, refer to experience and are opposed to external forms provide
the proper emphasis for this type of inquiry.

A Philosophical View of

Reform cites Bacon, Spinoza, Hobbes, Bayle, and Montaigne as originators
of this new form of inquiry (VII, p. 8)."*

Docke and the

'philosophers

3 Compare "Julian and Maddalo," 11. 170-171; "Ode to Liberty,"
11. 243-245; and A Philosophical View of R e f o r m : "Mankind seem to ac
quiesce, as in a necessary condition of the imbecility of their own will
and reason, in the existence of an aristocracy" (VII, p. 228).
4 Compare Prometheus U n b o u n d : " . . . The Man remains
King/ Over himself" (III, iv, 11. 193-197).
5 "Descartes cancelled for Bayle MS"

. . . the

(VII, p. 334).
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of his exact and intelligible but superficial school" come next and,
finally, Berkeley and Hume
Leibniz and Descartes,

(VII, pp. 8-9).

6

Unlike his contemporaries,

Spinoza, a Jew, was under no compulsion to adapt

his ideas to Christian theology.

"Speculations on Metaphysics," rejec

ting Aristotle for giving "Logic the name of Metaphysics," also censures
modern philosophers for not strictly adhering to Bacon's inductive
method

(VII, p. 63).^

A Philosophical View of R e f o r m , honouring the above-mentioned
philosophers, heralds a "new epoch" of philosophical inquiry which,
making a "deeper enquiry into the forms of human nature," finds ideas
which are "incompatible with an unreserved belief in any of those popular
mistakes upon which

popular systems of faith with respect tp the

and agencies of the

universe, with all their superstructure ofpolitical

and religious tyranny, are built"

(VII, p. 8).

cause

The practitioners of this

new philosophy
indicated inferences the most incompatible with the popular
religions and the established governments of Europe.
Philoso
phy went forth into the inchanted forest of the demons of
worldly power, as the pioneer of the over-growth of ages.
(VII, pp. 8-9)
The forests are the established beliefs of religion and government.

This

new philosophy, by investigating the forms of human nature, reveals an
incompatibility between man and existing systems of law.
these external forms through the use of reason.

Man has created

What these philosophers

found is that a re-establishment of external laws based on the Inner laws
of human nature is needed.

6 "Hartley" was cancelled for "Berkeley" in the manuscript
334) .

(VII, p.

7 Locke is included along with Aristotle, no doubt for becoming too
deeply concerned with words.
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Han has too long been defined in terms of the analytic fallacy.
Aristotle defines things in terms of their specific differences.
specific difference in man is his reason.

The

But too much emphasis has

been placed on his reason instead of a consideration of his integrity.
Man has been forced to play an angel while he is actually partly animal.
The modern philosophers attempted to investigate this fallacy.
Shelley, investigating the inner forms of human nature, finds that the
imagination is the superior faculty and more exactly defines man's
character.

!

He states in "Speculations on Metaphysics" that

Most of the errors of philosophers have arisen from
considering the human being in a point of view too detailed
and circumscribed.
He is not a moral, and an intellectual,
— but also, and pre-eminently, an imaginative being.
(VII, 65)

Man should be defined as an imaginative animal, which is his synthetic
difference from all other beings, not by his analytic split-up and there
fore false difference.
The chief problem of man in a world of change is his difficulty in
determining right and wrong; he lacks a stable basis from which to judge.
Shelley inherits the tradition of the eighteenth century empiricists who
do not allow for the existence of anything which cannot be experienced.
Since we never perceive the reality underlying appearances, the reason
is not infallible.

Hume, who applies this sceptical philosophy most

rigorously, finds, however, that the imagination gives man a degree of
stability; and Shelley seems to adopt his postion.
Hume describes two activities of the imagination.
combines ideas in an infinite variety of ways.

Through fancy it

Hume calls these ideas

g
"fictions".

The imagination also combines ideas according to certain

mental determinations when the mind is excited by external objects.
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6

ideas Hume calls "belief"

(Enquiries, p. 47).

Ideas of belief are dis

tinguished from fictions by a feeling implanted by the effect of custom
on our minds.

This latter activity of the imagination gives man a

degree of security in his judgments.
Custom is defined in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
Wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation
produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation,
without being impelled by any reasoning
or process ofthe
understanding, we always say, that this
propensity isthe
effect of custom.
(Enquiries, p. 43)
This propensity is due to the imagination.

The imagination is the cor

relating power between man and the universe. Whenever an object

is

presented to the memory or senses, the imagination revives itscorrelative
idea, the idea previously imprinted on the mind by nature.

The constant

conjunction of events observable in nature leads to the association of
ideas in the mind.

If the imagination is free to respond to impressions,

there will be a harmony between the thoughts in man's mind and the
course of nature and, although man is ignorant of the cause of events, he
finds security.
All of the ideas in man's mind have an essential unity, as they have
been associated by the "constant conjunction of events" observable in
■

nature.

9

Reason then considers the relations between ideas in order to

determine those which can be made subservient to our animal nature.

As

reason is the analytical faculty, it abstracts parts from the ideas
created by the imagination.

The abstractions are then taken as defining

8 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, ed. L.A.
Selby-Bigge (London, 1902), p . 47. All quotations from Hume's works,
unless otherwise noted, are from this edition.
9 Both Shelley and Hume use the phrase, "a constant conjunction of
events."
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the whole and, thus, the original unity is lost;
The one ^"imagination^ is the . . . principle of synthesis,
and has for its objects those forms which are common to
universal nature and existence itself; and the other is the
, . . principle of analysis, and its action regards the
relations of things, simply as relations; considering thoughts,
not in their integral unity, but as the algebraical represen
tations which conduct to certain general results.
(A Defence of P o etry, VII, p. 109)
Man defines things in terms of abstractions and such definitions
become his terms of reference in forming his judgments.

The qualitative

value of thoughts is forgotten and man loses his intense apprehension of
life.

He enslaves himself by submitting to an external order which seems

immutable, an observation which Shelley makes of the French in A Philoosphical View of R e f o r m :
The French were what their literature is (excluding M on
taigne and Rousseau, and some leaders of the . . . ) weak,
superficial, vain, with little imagination, and with passions
as well as judgments cleaving to the external form of things.
(VII, pp. 13-14)
A separation between reason and imagination causes evil, for thoughts
are no longer being considered in their "integral unity".

An "inter

mixture" of reason and imagination brings the qualitative value back into
thoughts.

This is represented in Prometheus Unbound when Asia and Pro

metheus are reunited.

Prometheus, whose name means foresight, represents

the imagination; Asia is love.

The two characters are able to perceive

the essential unity of all thoughts when they are united;
. . . We will search, with looks and words of love,
For hidden thoughts, . . . and . . .
Weave harmonies divine, yet ever new,
From difference sweet where discord cannot be.
(Ill, iii, 11. 34-39)
Through love, man is able to respond imaginatively.
underlying existence can then be seen.

The harmony

As Asia in Prometheus Unbound
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also says, "love . . . makes the reptile equal to the God"
39-43).

(II, v, 11.

Epipsychidion, written two years later, repeats the same idea:

I know
That Love makes all things equal: I have heard
By mine own heart this joyous truth averred:
The spirit of the worm beneath the sod
In love and worship, blends itself with God.
(11. 125-129)
The reason, as D.H. Lawrence illustrates in "Snake," distinguishes
between things and thus man commits evil:
The voice of my education said to me
He must be killed,
• For in Sicily the black, black snakes are innocent,
are venomous.

A

the gold

Defence of Poetry warns that a separation between reason and

imagination causes evil.

"Reasoners" must

beware that their speculations, for want of correspondence
with those first principles which belong to the imagination,
do not tend . . . to exasperate at once the extremes of
luxury and want. . . . The rich have become richer, and the
poor have become poorer . . . .
Such are theeffects
which
must ever flow from an unmitigated exercise of the calcula
ting faculty.
(VII, p. 132)
In an earlier draft of this same passage Shelley writes, "But without an
intermixture of the poetical element, such are the effects which must
ever flow from the unmitigated exercise of the reason"

(VII, p. 356).

Evil may be said to result from an imagination gap in man's moral judg
ments.

In my thesis. I wish to develop fully Shelley's interpretation of

the imagination and the reason and the roles he assigns to each.
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THE IMAGINATION AND THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
A discussion of reason and imagination and the roles proper to each
makes up much of the content of _A Defence of Poet r y .

In that work

Shelley calls the imagination the creative faculty and reason the analy
tic, designating the former as the superior power.

The function of the

imagination seems to be to create the forms, habits and ideas of man's
thought.
Shelley's interpretation of the imaginaton is significant, for it
aligns him with one of two contending schools regarding the origin of
ideas.

It has long been the problem of philosophy to determine the

source of ideas which form the basis of thought.

Two schools of thought

which have arisen are innatism, or rationalism, and empiricism.
Empiricism opposes innatism.

The innatists profess that ideas, such

as the archetypes of Plato, already exist in our minds and sensation is
only necessary to realize them.

The empiricists hold that there are no

innate ideas; everything comes from experience.

|

Man, however, feels

that there is a connection between cause and effect.
the empiricists,

The problem of

then, is to account for the association of ideas— how

does man arrive at concepts in a world of change?
God orders the ideas in our mind.

Berkeley uses theism;

But, lacking proof of the existence

of God, a rigorous sceptic finds this an unacceptable explanation.

In

place of God, Hume argues that the customary transition of the imagina-

9
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tion from one object to its usual attendant implants this feeling in m a n ’s
m i n d . (Enquiries, p. 75).
Man does not know the true nature of existence.

As Shelley says in

the Defence when he states a basic tenet of H u m e ’s philosophy, "We know
no more of cause and effect than a constant conjunction of events"
p. 119).

We cannot see beyond the appearances of things.

(VII,

For example,

never perceiving the actual link between cause and effect, man cannot see
how the impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second:
"This is the whole that appears to the outward senses.

The mind feels

no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects . . . "
(Enquiries, p. 63).
Because objects only present an appearance to our senses, Hume calls
our sense-data "impressions," a term which Shelley also uses.

In the

Defence Shelley calls impressions which have been elaborated into per
ceptions and then into conceptions "images,1' thus retaining the sense
that man only knows the appearances of t h ings:

1

The savage . . . expresses the emotions
produced in him by
surrounding objects in a similar manner; and language and
gesture, together with plastic and pictorial imitation,
become the image of the combined effect
of those objects, and
of his apprehension of them.
(VII, p. 110)
In the first moments of perception man is aware only of sensations.

Primary sensations are not organized in the mind.

It is not until later

that they are elaborated into perceptions and, subsequently, into con
ceptions.

The child, which Shelley uses in numerous essays as an

example of man in his origins, makes no distinction between itself and
the external world around it.
ness of life.

A child at first has an intense aware

There is no distinction between consciousness and the

unconscious at this stage.

All of the impressions of its earliest forms
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of experience are stored in the mind as latent ideas.
The imagination is the mental power which revives ideas from the
unconscious storehouse.

Sensible impressions which appear similar are

seen to recur and are associated in the mind.

This association takes

place when an object, presented again to our memory or senses, causes
the imagination to revive its correlative idea.

This concurrence of

views reinforces the idea more strongly on the imagination.

Eventually,

a feeling of expectation develops which distinguishes between ideas
revived by the senses and fictions of the imagination.

This entire

activity is uncontrolled by man; in fact, a passive mind makes a more
fertile soil for the implanting of associations.
Hume uses the example of a billiard ball rolling toward another on
a smooth table to illustrate how a feeling of expectation develops in
man.

He states that in man's first observation of a billiard ball rol

ling toward another, he is unable to predict the effect.

It is only

after impulse is imparted to the second ball that he knows a causal re
lation.

The frequent recurrence of this conjunction of events leads

the mind to expect a similar effect from similar causes.

If a man sees

a billiard ball rolling toward another, the conception that it will stop
upon contact implies no inherent contradiction.

But this conception

feels very differently from the conception of motion being imparted to
the second b a l l . ^
This conditioning gives man foresight.

When a billiard ball is seen

rolling towards another his thought goes forward in imagination to anti-

10 The idea of motion being imparted to the second ball is a matter
of probability not of fact; the ball could equally well bounce off the
second ball, fly into the air, etc.
Knowledge only extends to that
which has the highest probability.
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cipate experience and in doing so it finds nature confirming its venture.
Nature implants an instinct in man and, although he is ignorant of the
powers and forces which govern nature, he finds that his thoughts and
conceptions have still gone on in the same train with the other works
of nature

(Enquiries, pp. 54-55).

"Here, then, is a kind of pre-estab

lished harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our
ideas . . . "

(Enquiries, p. 54).

In the Defence- Shelley, explaining how poetry, which he calls the
"expression of the imagination," is created, gives an interpretation of
the imagination similar to H u m e ’s:
Man is an instrument over which a series of external and
internal impressions are driven, like the alternations of an
ever-changing wind over an AEolian lyre, which move it by
their motion to ever-changing melody.
But there is a prin
ciple within the human being, and perhaps within all sentient
beings, which acts otherwise than in the lyre, and produces
not melody alone, but harmony, by an internal adjustment of
the sounds or motion's thus excited to the impressions which
excite them.
(VII, p. 109)
The lyre metaphor appeals to the Romantic poets because the melody is
not played by man, but by nature.
instrument.

Nature is the musician and man the

The first sentence of the quotation implies that man plays

a passive role when he receives impressions, a suggestion which is
borne out in other works of Shelley.

For example, "Mont Blanc" refers

to the imprinting of impressions as,
My own, my human mind, which passively
Now renders and receives fast influencings,
Holding an unremitting interchange
With the clear universe of things around . . . .
(11. 37-40)
The mind also "passively . . . renders

. . . influencings

. . . ".

This

means that when an object is present to the memory or senses the imagina
tion acts independently of m a n ’s conscious will.
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Man seems subject to playing an ever-changing melody, reflecting
the constant change around him, but the remainder of the lyre metaphor
makes clear that he is capable of a response.

A "principle" within him,

the imagination, creates harmony by exciting "sounds or motions" which
are similar to the impression.

My interpretation of this, following

Hume, is that the imagination revives ideas which are similar to the
impressions.

These ideas are accompanied by emotions, the feelings of

expectation implanted in man by his observation of the "constant conjunc
tion of events" in nature.
The "principle" within man produces harmony by "an internal adjust
ment,"

In his first draft of this passage Shelley had said that this was

an "instinctive adjustment"

(VII, p. 352).

Instinct is a term which Hume

also uses to explain this operation of the imagination:

"^Nature]

has

. . . implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in
a correspondent course to that which she has established among external
objects

. . . "

(Enquiries, p. 56).

Similarly, in "On the Punishment of

Death," Shelley says that a "feeling" is "implanted" by the "habitual
perception" of an action (VI, p. 189).
Although the imagination seems free to combine, take apart, and
produce ideas in any order at all, it is actually determined by our very
human nature to operate in certain regular ways.

As Shelley says

further in the D e f e n c e , "It is as if the lyre could accomodate its chords
to the motions of that which strikes them, in a determined proportion of
sound" (VII, p. 109).

Mental customs are dispositions engendered by the

working together of human nature with the nature which is beyond us but
of which we are still an integral part.
It is to be noticed that both Shelley and Hume have defined the
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imagination in the foregoing examples as being the correlating factor
which revives latent ideas from the unconscious storehouse and relates
them to present impressions.

Both men are concerned with man's inabili

ty to know the true nature of existence, because of his inability to see
beyond the appearances of things.

But man does acquire definite habits

of causal inference due to the operation of the imagination.
The imagination has command over all the ideas in the mind.

This

range of the imagination makes it the most efficient power for reviving
ideas which are correlative to the impressions.

This is a kind of

sensory judgment as the ideas are revived by nature.

Since these ideas

are in harmony with nature, Hume calls them ‘'ideas of judgment"
quiries , p . 49) .
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CHAPTER II

THE REASON

AND THE DISSOCIATION OF IDEAS

Imagination, the creative

faculty,

creates the ideas which form the

basis of thought by the process of association.
in the mind have an essential unity.

Therefore all the ideas

Reason, the analytic faculty, can

only consider relations between ideas already created by the imagination.
It thus has a secondary role.

The Defence states that reasoners "follow

the footsteps of poets, and copy the sketches of their creations into
the book of common life"

(VII, p.

tion of quantities already known"

132); and that "Reason is the enumera
(VII, p* 109).

Reason is considered as "mind contemplating the relations borne by
one thought to another" (Defence, VII, p. 109) for the purpose of deter
mining "what thoughts are most invariably subservient to the security and
happiness of life" ("Speculations

on Metaphysics," VII, p. 60). When

reason analyzes the ideas created

by the imagination, it divides them

parts, substituting traits

for the whole.

The traits, in

to define ideas as a whole

and their "integral unity" is forgotten.

into

turn, are taken
A

gradual separation between internal and external takes place and man
eventually submits to the "external" form of things.
Man can not discover the effect a priori from its cause, because he
never perceives the reality behind appearances

(Enquiries, p. 30).

is totally dependent upon experience for knowledge.

He

Because of the uni

formity of events in nature, his mind acquires determined habits of men
tal action.

We believe that we know the actual connection between cause

15 -
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and effect,

Thus, although necessity occurs only as a mental determina

tion upon experiencing certain impressions, we have a tendency to locate
this mental event in the observed events, and to think of it as occurring
there with the events, even though it is actually taking place in our
minds.
' This inherent fallacy in all reasoning of taking premises for fact
leads to errors in speculation.

Man reasons from these facts, believing

that he knows the true nature of existence.
distinction between internal and external.
nection between events is only internal.

This belief creates the
The idea of a necessary con

Considering necessity as ex-

I
ternal is the inherent source of m a n ’s errors in speculation.

"Specula

tions on Metaphysics" alludes to this problem:

i

Aristotle and his followers, Locke and most of the modern
Philosophers gave Logic the name of Metaphysics.
Nor have
those who are accustomed to profess the greatest veneration
for the inductive system of Lord Bacon adhered with suffi
cient scrupulousness to its regulations.
They have professed
indeed (and who have not professed?) to deduce their conclu
sions from indisputable facts.
How came many of those facts
to be called indisputable? What sanctioning correspondence
unites a concatenation of syllogisms?
Their promises of
deducing all systems from facts has too often been performed
by appealing in favour of these pretended realities to the
obstinate preconceptions of the multitude; or by the most
preposterous mistake of a name for a t h i n g . ^
(VII, p. 63)
Shelley,

in Queen Mab, one of his early poems, commits the error of

locating necessity in external nature, an error which Frank B. Evans
points out.

12

Both Shelley and his mentor, Godwin, assert that the

11 Locke is included because of his too great concern with words.
12 Frank B. Evans, "Shelley, Godwin, Hume, and the Doctrine of
Necessity," Studies in P h i lology, XXXVII (1940),
632-40.
Godwin in
his book, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, closely follows Hume,
and Shelley, Godwin. . Evans picks out parallel passages to show the
similarities between the three.
Godwin in many places even uses the
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necessity of causation inheres in the structure of reality.

They become

dogmatic about the doctrine, giving it the status of a science.

In his

discussion of necessity in An Enquiry Concerning Political J ustice, God
win declares that the causes of a human's actions can be known:
He who affirms that all actions are necessary, means that, if
we form a just and, complete view of all the circumstances in
which a living or intelligent being is placed, we shall find
that he could not in any moment of his existence have acted
otherwise than he has acted.
According to this assertion
there is in the transactions of mind nothing loose, precari
ous and uncertain.
Shelley, following Godwin, says in Queen M a b :
Were the doctrine of Necessity false, the human mind would no
longer be a legitimate object of science. . . . The precise
character and motives of any man on any occasion being given,
the moral philosopher could predict his actions with as much
certainty as the natural philosopher could predict the effects
of the mixture of any particular chemical substances.
(I, p. 144)
Shelley places faith in the infallibility of the senses and reason:
The senses are the sources of all knowledge to the mindj
consequently their evidence claims the strongest assent,,
The decision of the mind, founded upon our own experience,
derived from these sources, claims the next degree.
(Queen M a b , I, p. 146)
One scene in Queen Mab symbolically places passion below reason:
Reason was free; and wild though Passion went
Through tangled glens and wood-embosomed meads,
Gathering a garland of the strangest flowers,
Yet like the bee returning to her queen,
She bound the sweetest on her sister's brow
Who meek and sober kissed the sportive child,
No longer trembling at the broken rod.
(IX, 11. 50-56)

same examples as Hume.
Evans also shows that Godwin led Shelley to Hume,
for certain passages in the notes to Queen Mab are not in Godwin, but
are found in Hume.
13 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political J ustice, in Prose
of the Romantic P e r i o d , ed. Carl R. Woodring (Boston, 1961), p. 19,
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Since Shelley's assertion of the doctrine of Necessity as a rigorous
science enables him to unveil the cause of evil, he is also able to sug
gest the cure:
How can we take the benefits and reject the evils of the
system, which is now interwoven with all the fibres of our
being?— I believe that abstinence from animal food and spiritous liquors would in a great measure capacitate us for the
solution of this important question.
(Queen M a b , I , p. 159)
Shelley later drops his advocacy of vegetarianism in his poetry, no doubt
because of his awareness that the cause of evil lay deeper.
Shelley advocated vegetarianism because he felt that man had devia
ted from nature by eating flesh.

He also included air pollution, crowded

cities, and the "muffling of our bodies in superfluous apparel"
Mab, I, p. 159) as causes of evil.

(Queen

Once he realized that the course of

nature was less easily known, he discarded this line of reasoning.

He

was really only blaming the effects of evil rather than the cause.
His faith in reason enables Shelley to state exactly in Queen Mab
what the cause of evil is, but, later, the problem of assigning specific
causes to specific effects becomes more difficult.
toward the doctrine of necessity is sceptical,
sophy.

Hume's attitude

in keeping with his philo

He denies any certainty of knowledge due to reason and the senses.

Shelley gradually tends toward Hume's position that it is impossible to
know rationally the actual principle of connection between cause and
effect.
Another significant distinction which Shelley makes between reason
and imagination is that the former is a conscious power and the latter,
unconscious.

We find in the Defence that poetry, the "expression of the

imagination," is "not like reasoning, a power to be exerted according to
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the determination of the will" (VII, p. 135); and, a few pages later,
"Poetry . . .

in this respect differs from logic, that it is not subject

to the control of the . . . consciousness or will" (VII, p. 138).
"the mind in creation is as a fading coal"

(Defence', VII,

As

p. 135), its

conceptions fade more and more as we consciously try to recapture them.
Thus, because the reason is not able to recollect all the events asso
ciated with an object or action, its judgments are prone to be erroneous.
Originally, in the early stages of man's mental development, there
is no distinction between the two levels of consciousness, a condition
described in "On L i f e " :
Let us recollect our sensations as children.
What a
distinct and intense apprehension had we of the world and of
ourselves!
Many of the circumstances of social life were
then important to us which are now no longer so. . . . W e
less habitually distinguished all that we saw and felt, from
ourselves.
They seemed as it were to constitute one mass.
There are some persons who, in this respect, are always chil
dren.
Those who are subject to the state called reverie,
.feel as if their nature were dissolved into the surrounding
universe, or as if the surrounding universe were absorbed
into their being.
They are conscious of no distinction.
And
these are states which precede, or accompany, or follow an
unusually intense and vivid apprehension of life.
As men
grow up this power commonly decays and they become mechani
cal and habitual agents.
Thus feelings and then reasonings
are the combined result of a multitude of entangled thoughts,
and of a series of what are called impressions, planted by
reiteration.
(VI, pp. 195-196)
Man,

habituated to existence,

ness

of an object.

"fills out" his previously empty conscious

This "represents a logically distinct kind of

sciousness, not some flow of feeling."

14

con-

Man then makes a distinction

between external and internal which leads him to assume that objects
are entities in themselves.

Believing that he knows the actual thing

itself, man ends up consciously adjusting himself to an "external" exis-

14 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego
p. 112.

(New York,
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tence instead of reversing this process,

The ability to manipulate

existence is lost and instead of being the shaper, man becomes shaped.
Man, cursing the evils of existence, is only cursing his own creations.
Having lost his intense awareness of life, man forgets that things
exist as they are perceived.

"The mind is its own place, and in its

self/ Can make a H e a v ’n of Hell a Hell of- Heav'n."

15

In many places in

his work Shelley refers to m a n ’s belief that the necessity of causation
inheres in the structure of the universe and that things exist in them
selves as a "veil" which obscures from him the true nature of existence.
When man reasons, his consciousness exercises a tyranny over his
unconscious and he is less capable of an imaginative response:
. . . Thought can with difficulty visit the intricate and
winding chambers which it inhabits.
It is like a river whose
rapid and perpetual stream flows outwards . . . .
The caverns
of the mind are obscure, and shadowy; or pervaded with a
lustre, beautifully bright indeed, but
shining not beyond
their portals.
If it were possible to be where
we have been,
vitally and indeed— if, at the moment of our presence there,
we could define the results of our experience,— if the pas
sage from sensation to reflection— from a state of passive
perception to voluntary contemplation, were not so dizzying
and so tumultuous, this attempt would be less difficult.
("Speculations on Metaphysics,"
VII, p. 64)
The revival of latent ideas by the imagination is involuntary.
son,

The rea

which is voluntary and conscious, does not have this command over

the storehouse of ideas.

Reason would thus

miss the peculiar nature of

an action in tending to fit impressions to preconceptions.
Using reason, man assumes that the future will conform to the past,

pare:

15 Shelley uses this quotation in the Defence (VII, p. 137).
Christopher Marlowe, Doctor F a ustus:
Fa u s t . How comes it, then, that thou art out of hell?
M e p h . Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it . . ..
(Ill, 11. 87-88)
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narrowing his range of thought.

The reasoner, like Procrustes, usually

makes actions fit his preconceptions, whether they do or not.

Habit,

leading man to believe that cause, inheres in nature, causes him to take
a fatalistic attitude toward life.

By accepting events as inevitable, he

loses his spontaneity as his imaginative response becomes duller and
duller.

Without the imaginative response there is no accompanying feeling

and, thus, less able to determine the value of his thoughts, man is
prone to commit error.
Several of Shelley's works state that man escapes the tyranny of the
consciousness if he has a passive state of mind.

This mental condition

is best engendered by not distinguishing between the present and the
past and, as "On the Punishment of Death" states, it is found in all
those not yet dulled by society:
The savage and the illiterate are but faintly aware of the
distinction between the future and the past; they make actions
belonging to periods so distinct, the subjects of similar
feelings . . . .
(VI, p. 189)
In the infancy of society, according to the Defence, every author is
"necessarily a poet"
unbound.

(VII, p. Ill), because the imaginative response is

The consciousness does not exert a control and the mind is in

its freest state to respond to impressions.
Since man cannot trust his own reasoning, he needs to live always
in the present.

Then the mind is more able to render the correct res

ponse to the present impressions.

Since nature is in continual change,

the organization of the subconscious storehouse never ends.

This organ

ization can take place more easily with a passive frame of mind.

This

is the passive interchange which the passage in "Mont Blanc," mentioned
earlier,

describes.

By relying on reason, the mind is too fatalistically
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orientated and the imaginative response is smothered,
Due to the effect of custom, the imaginative response is attended
with a feeling which helps man to determine the value of his ideas.

The

experience of a strong feeling assures him that nature will confirm the
venture of his thought when it goes forward in imagination to anticipate
experience.

This foresight gives man a degree of security in a world in

which he is subjected continually to the ’’accident of surrounding impres
sions"

(Defence, VII, p. 137)*

Man's unconscious response to "impressions"

is more in harmony with "nature" or "society" than his conscious response
is ever capable of.
Considering the roles assigned to imagination and reason in the
D e f e n c e , we see that it negates Peacock's thesis in The Four Ages of
Poetry.

Peacock argues that the advance of knowledge and reason propor

tionately circumscribes the subject matter of poetry, for superstition,
which excites the passions of man, is dispelled, and what was formerly
expressed by poetry is now better said by prose.

Shelley defeats Pea

cock's attack by showing that it is possible to doubt the certainty of
knowledge, and if knowledge is uncertain, then reason is not infallible.
The reason is necessary to determine which thoughts can be made
subservient to the needs of man, but the mystery remains despite man's
quantitative measurements.
known,

Since the true nature of existence is not

the imagination, with its access to the record imprinted by na

ture on the minds of men, gives man a modicum of security in a world of
change.

Poets, expressing the influence of society or nature upon their

mind, may only create a "reflected image" of the "agencies of the invisi
ble world," but there is a certain order in their creations which is
"indestructible"

(Defence, VII, p. 109).

Man may only be capable of
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creating "superstitions," but because of the order reflected in his
expressions,

"all original religions are allegorical or susceptible of

allegory, and, like Janus, have a double face of false and true"
fence , VII, p. 112).
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CHAPTER III

MAN'S SOCIAL INSTINCTS
"Speculations on Metaphysics" and "Speculations on Morals" describe
the development of m a n ’s awareness of his fellow man.

The ideas con

tained in these two works are similar to those in the De f e n c e .

The sig

nificance of this aspect of Shelley's philosophy is that relations
between men implant a number of instincts much in the same way that
nature does.

These instincts, peculiar to man's social nature, are cal

led "social sympathies"

(Defence, VII, p. 110).

The Defence explains that the social sympathies "begin to develop
themselves from the moment that two human beings coexist
p. 110).

. . . "

(VII,

They are another set of principles, in addition to those im

planted by nature, which determine man's will into action (Defence, VII,
p.. 110).

Since man is a "social animal," he expresses not only the influ

ence of nature on his mind, but also of society.

The social sympathies,

learned entirely by experience, develop because man in society, "with
all his passions and his pleasures, next becomes the object of the pas
sions and pleasures of man; an additional class of emotions produces an
augmented treasure of expressions" (De f e n c e , VII, p. 110).
"Speculations on Metaphysics" explains how the social sympathies
develop.

It states that we are "intuitively conscious" of our own

existence, and "of that connection in the train of our successive ideas,
which we term our identity"

(VII, p. 61).

But since we do not know the

true nature of existence, our awareness of our fellow human beings is

24
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"founded upon a very complicated relation of ideas . , , " (VII, p. 61).
This awareness would have to be developed by the cultivation of the ima
gination.
mind.

Because of the effect of custom, ideas are associated in the

These ideas are revived by the imagination when a similar object

is presented again to the senses.

Finally, we experience a "periodical

recurrence of masses of ideas, which our own voluntary determinations
have, in one peculiar direction, no power to circumscribe or to arrest,
and against the recurrence of which they can only imperfectly provide"
(VII, p. 61).
We gradually become aware of "living beings in our own shape, and
in shapes more or less analogous to our own"

(VII, p. 61).

first stage of our awareness of our fellow beings.

This is the

The second stage, as

"Speculations on Morals" goes on to explain next, takes place when "ac
cents and gestures" of these shapes are "referred to the feelings which
they express"

(VII, p. 75).

Thus, we become aware that there are crea

tures similar to ourselves which experience kindred feelings..
It is significant that man measures "external" existence by referring
to his own feeling.
to our own feelings.

We can only recognize a fellow creature by referring
If we see a creature,

similar to ourselves,

sig

nalling pleasure or pain with actions similar to our own, we recognize it
as human.

A similar criterion measures events in nature.

A conception,

revived by some event in nature, is accompanied by a feeling.
have some security that a certain event will follow.
due to the response implanted in man by nature.

Thus, we

This feeling is

M a n ’s only point of

stability in a world of change is a pleasurable or painful feeling.

Be

cause there is no essential distinction between thoughts, "Speculations
on Metaphysics" states that important distinctions of various degrees of

.199569
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force are to be established between them if they are to be "subjects of
ethical and oeconomical discussion"

(VII, p, 60),

Along with his developing awareness of other men, man gains an
awareness of what is good and evil regarding human relations.

"Specula-

tions on Morals" provides important background to this aspect of Shelley's
philosophy.

Significantly in that work he says that the "benevolent pro

pensities are inherent in the human mind"

(VII, p. 77).

"A human being

such as is man considered in his origin, a child a month old, has a very
imperfect consciousness of the existence of other natures resembling it
self" ("Speculations on Morals," VII, p. 74).

It is entirely preoccupied

with extinguishing the "pains with which it is perpetually assailed"
pp. 74-75)«

(VII,

"That is called good which produces pleasure; that is called

evil which produces pain"

(VII, p. 73).

As soon as the child/man in his origins becomes aware of the exis
tence of its fellow men by referring "accents and gestures" significant
of pain to the feelings that they suggest, it desires that these pains
in its fellow creature should cease too (VII, p. 75).

Since the child/

man in his origins naturally desires the extinction of its own pains, the
extension of this attitude to its fellow creature is also instinctive.
Since "pain is . . . apprehended to be evil for its own sake, with
out any other necessary reference to the mind by which

s existence is

perceived than] such as is indispensible to its perception"

(VII, p. 75),

there is no need for abstract rules to govern relations between men.

An

intense apprehension of subtle signs of human feeling is deemed more im
portant.

Chapter II, Section ii, of "Speculations on Morals" advises that

"Moral Science Consists in Considering the Difference, not the Resemblance,
of Persons"

(VII, p. 81).

Man has too long based law on the resemblances.
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Man, not knowing the true nature of existence, must test his obser
vations by referring to his own feelings.’
his mind is "incapable

of

Solitary man is selfish,

receiving an accurate intimation of the n a 

ture of pain as existing in beings resembling itself"
Morals," VII, p. 75).

for

("Speculations on

But in society, when he learns to "acutely sym

pathise with the sufferings and enjoyments of others"

(VII, p. 75), he

will avoid those actions which cause pain and pursue those which cause
pleasure.

His moral progress depends upon an extension of his own feelings

into the world around him.
An alert perception of subtle nuances of expression would awaken
fully m a n ’s mind to the vast range of feelings which his fellow man is
capable of.

He can learn to sympathize fully with his fellow man by

empathy, putting himself in the place of others.

He also enlarges the

circumference of his imagination by familiarizing himself with poetry and
philosophy,

the records of the varieties of human e x p e r i e n c e . ^

Man's relationship with his fellow man, the realm of morality and
the one area in which he can control good or evil, can be seen as two
concentric circles.

The inner circle represents those closest to him.

Man, not knowing the true nature of existence, must test his observations
by referring to his own feelings.

It is relatively easy to recognize

the signs which are significant of good or evil in the inner group; plea
sure or pain are as evident as a smile or a grimace.

Benevolence thus

comes easily in a situation where man can immediately measure the feelings
of his fellow beings.
However, the outer circle,

including a much larger number of people,

16 Shelley makes this suggestion in both "Speculations on Morals,"
VII, p. 75, and A Defence of P o e t r y , VII, p. 117.
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presents a problem to man's powers of observation,

Man is led by his

benevolent propensities to regard every human being indifferently with
whom he comes into contact.

But the benevolent propensities "have pr e 

ference only with respect to

those who offer themselves most obviously to

[hisj

notice"

("Speculations on Morals," VII, p. 77).

Human beings are indiscriminating and blind; they will avoid
inflicting pain, though that pain should be attended with
eventual benefit; they will seek to confer pleasure without
calculating the mischief that.may result.
They benefit one
at the expense of many. ("Speculations on Morals," VII, p. 77)
It is difficult to tell if an action which benefits a member in the inner
circle of relationships does not ultimately cause pain to the group as a
whole.

Man can no longer depend upon his immediate feelings of benevo

lence as excited by an empathy with those nearest to him.

To fully bring

about pleasure to the group as a whole, an Utilitarian principle which is
part of Shelley's philosophy, man must cultivate his imagination by a
careful observation of the consequences of his actions.

A greater ex

tension of man's feelings into the surrounding universe is required to
include a much larger group of people.
An essay, "On the Punishment of- Death," describes the cultivation
of one such "combination" of ideas:
The passion of revenge is originally nothing more than
an habitual perception of the ideas of the sufferings of theperson who inflicts an injury, as connected, as they are in
a savage state, or in such portions of society as are yet
undisciplined to civilization, with security that that injury
will not be repeated in future.
This feeling, engrafted upon
superstition and confirmed by habit, at last loses sight of
the only object for which it may be supposed to have been
implanted, and becomes a passion and a duty to be pursued
and fulfilled, even to the destruction of those ends to which
it originally tended.
(VI, p. 189)
Several ideas in this statement are relevant to my thesis.

First is the

fact that the social sympathies are engendered by an "habitual percep-
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tion" and, secondly, that this involves the implanting of a "feeling"
which would distinguish between good ideas and evil ones.
Thirdly, the fact that the consequences of actions have to be
noted,

implies that the mind cannot determine, in the first occurrence

of an action, its moral tenour.

One person injures another.

minal is punished and the effects duly noted.
a salutary effect.

The cri

The punishment should have

If it does not, its future application in an iden

tical situation should be more severe-or less.

A process of experimen

tation is necessary to determine the proper proportion of punishment to
mete out.^^
imagination.

The habitual perception of these actions cultivates the
"Speculations on Morals," describing a similar process,

states that "The imagination thus acquires by exercise a habit as it
were of perceiving and abhorring evil"
states,

(VII, p. 75).

As the Defence

the imagination is, thus, not only the author of "language,

colour, and form," but of "religious and civil habits of action"

(VII,

p. 113).
The discovery that punishment may ultimately be beneficial,

that it

may be applied as a means of moral improvement, is probably accidental at
first.

Man in his origin would exist in a rude state for many years be

fore the organization of his unconscious finally lifts him out of his
savage condition.

Eventually, however, acute observers, noting the

effects of certain actions and by using trial and error, would learn how
to fit means to ends which are desirable.

The habitual perception of

17 See also "Speculations on Morals";
"It is in the due apprecia
ting the general effects of their peculiarities, and in cultivating the
habit of acquiring decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising
out of £them] in particular cases, that the the most important part of
moral science consists (VII, p. 82).
The reference is to the actions of
men.
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those actions which successfully achieve the effects desired should re~
sult in a reinforcement of those views on the mind, and create a feeling
of expectation which would enable man to determine the value of his judg
ment.

'
Once the combination of ideas has been implanted, the antecedent

ones revive their correlatives, and feeling determines their good or evil
nature.

Thus man develops foresight, due to the cultivation of the ima-

gination, which gives him control over the consequences of his actions.
"Imagination or mind employed in prophetically [imaging forth]

its objects

is that faculty of human nature on which every gradation of its progress,
nay, every, the minutest change depends"

("Speculations on Morals," VII,

p. 75).
Man has to perceive subtle variations in human behaviour, not only
for the imagination to revive correlative ideas effectively, but to con
tinue the process of cultivating the imagination.

Shelley stresses the

importance of intensely apprehending the present, designating anyone who
has this capability, a poet:
For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and
discovers those laws according to which present things ought
to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and
his thoughts are the
germs of the flower and the fruit of
latest time.
(Defence, VII,
p. 112)
A few lines before this passage, Shelley states, "To be a poet is to appreh e n d the true and the beautiful,
the relation,

subsisting,

in a word,

the good which exists in

first between existence and perception, and

secondly between perception and

expression"

(VII, pp. 111-112).
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CHAPTER IV

MAN'S DISSOCIATED SENSIBILITY AND EVIL
All of the creations of the imagination have an "integral unity".
For example, originally, the habit of revenge was the idea of punishment
leading to some beneficial effect.

Man acts out of disinterested bene

volence and an imaginative response determines the proportion of punish
ment to apply in any particular case.

Gradually, however, man's feelings

which determine the value of his imaginative response and guide

his

judgment, degenerate into passions, a breakdown which "On the Punishment
of Death" describes:
This feeling, engrafted upon superstition and confirmed by
habit, at last loses sight of the only object for which it
may be supposed to have been implanted, and becomes a passion
and a duty to be pursued and fulfilled, even^go the destruction
of those ends to which it originally tended.
(VI, p. 189)
Through repetition, man forgets the qualitative value of punishment.
He punishes for its own sake, forgetting its legitimate end.
becomes a passion and man a mechanical and habitual agent.

The feeling
His reason,

a conscious power, considering the relations between ideas, is unable to
recall all the ideas associated with a particular event.

Certain quali

ties are taken as defining the whole and man loses the essential unity

18 Shelley similarly describes the decay of values in "On Life":
"As men grow up . . . they become mechanical and habitual agents.
Thus
feelings and then reasonings are the combined result of a multitude of
entangled thoughts, and of a series of what are called impressions,
planted by reiteration" (VI., p. 196).
31
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of the ideas.

In the case of revenge, punishment becomes the quality

which defines the habit as a whole:

.

. . . Their daily occupations constraining them to a precise
form in all their thoughts, they come to connect inseparably
the idea of their own advantage with that of the death and
torture of others. ("On the Punishment of Death," VI, pp. 188189)
Man then applies punishment with no respect to its end.

Other erroneous

excesses would present a similar decay of values and separation between
reason and imagination.
If man does not distinguish between the future and the past but
lives intensely in the present, he would regard each event as different
from another.

He would not give any preference to any particular course

of action, but, instead, all the particular events comprehended in the
present action would be rendered entirely equal.

This is the nature of

chance and our ignorance of the real cause of any event should beget its
influence on the understanding

(Enquiries, pp. 56-57).

As "Speculations

on Morals" says, "In truth, no one action has, when considered in its
whole extent, an essential resemblance with any other"

(VII, p: 81).

If man has this passive mental condition, his imagination is free
to render an imaginative response..

"On the Punishment of Death" cites

the savage and the illiterate, those who are still not dulled by society,
as having the freest mental condition:
The savage and the illiterate are but faintly aware of
the distinction between the future and the past; they make
actions belonging to periods so distinct, the subjects of
similar feelings; they live only in the present, or.' in the
past, as it is present.
It is in this that the philosopher
excels one of the many; it is this which distinguishes the
doctrine of philosophic necessity from fatalism; and that
determination of the will, by which it is the active source
of future events, from that liberty or indifference, to which
the abstract liability of irremediable actions is attached,
according to the notions of the vulgar. (VI, p. 189)
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Evil results when man consciously attempts to fit means to ends:
This is the source of the erroneous excesses of Remorse
and
Revenge; the one extending itself over the future, and
the other over the past; provinces in which their suggestions
can only be the sources of evil.
The purpose of a resolution
to act more wisely and virtuously in future, and the sense of
a necessity of caution in repressing an enemy, are the sources
from which the enormous superstitions implied in the words
cited have arisen. ("On the Punishment of Death," VI, p. 189)
"Ode to Liberty" describes creations of the imagination as "winged
sound[s]" which soar "where Expectation never flew,/ Rending the veil of
space and time asunder!"

(11. 84-86).

Once man becomes habituated, he judges in terms of the past; his
judgment is conscious, not unconscious.
his preconception

and he may punish

the mind overshooting

The present event may not fit

unjustly.

This characteristic of

the mark for which it aims is the cause of the

erroneous excesses in m a n ’s reasoning ("On the Punishment of Death,"
VI, p. 189).

When thought is constrained to a precise form, the mind

is not free to respond imaginatively.
The uniformity of events observable in nature leads man to follow a
similar uniformity in his actions
96).

(Enquiries, Sect. VIII, Part I, pp. 80-

The actions of men are thus grouped or categorized and the peculiar

S

nature of actions is missed.
is not possible.

Therefore, the correct imaginative response

For example, when a criminal commits a crime he is

simply punished in response to a fixed law which may not fit the parti
cular case.

Only the imagination, with power over all the ideas in the

mind, can respond efficiently to the peculiar nature of the case.

A

conscious attempt to fit means to ends may be the cause of injustice.
Chapter II, ii, of "Speculations on Morals," claiming that "no one
action has, when considered in its whole extent, an essential resemblance
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with any other," argues that moral progress depends upon noting differ
ences in human actions, not their similarities

(VII, p. 81).

Subtle

differences in human actions have to be noted in order to refer them to
the correct feeling which they suggest.

In this way the cultivation of

the imagination, which is a continual process, can take place.
R e a soners, copying the creations of poets into the book of common
life, forget that poets are only expressing their own mental determina
tion and locate this mental determination in nature.

The expression of

the poet, which is only an "image" of the surrounding objects, becomes
fixed.

Reasoners, considering only the quantitative value of thoughts,

forget the qualitative.

Calculations based on these quantities lead to

error when reasoners fail to accommodate them to our inner nature.
Calculations have to be accommodated to man's inner nature according
to the pleasure-pain principle.

The effects of each calculation must be

noted so that it can be adjusted in order to bring about the desired
pleasurable effect.

In the act of revenge man only gradually learns

through experience the degree of punishment to apply which benefits
society as a whole.
perception,

His imagination,

cultivated through an habitual

can then give him a degree of certainty in his actions.

Lancelot Law Whyte in his book The Next Development in Man describes
the effect of the failure to accommodate analytical reasoning to the inner
nature of man:
The essential feature of laissez faire was the assumption that
the automatic operation of the quantity symbols, through the
actions of individuals organizing their behaviour by^geans of
them, would lead to the satisfaction of human needs.

19 Lancelot Law Whyte, The Next Development in Man (New York, 1950),
p. 116.
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The evil in this system was the fact that it did not provide for the
"catharsis of rhythmic relaxation or satisfying achievement."

Man was

left instead "perpetually lusting for more."
Another nought on an order, and the worldwide machinery of
credit operated without scrutiny of purpose or result, and
thousands more were able to live or compelled to die, to work
more or less, to g^perience once again the instability of
their employment.
Shelley pointed out this same principle in the De f e n c e .

He states

that reason, which has "enlarged the limits of the empire of man over
the external world, has, for want of the poetical faculty, proportional
ly circumscribed those of the internal world"

(VII, p. 134).

There is

more "scientific and economical knowledge than can be accommodated to the
just distribution of the produce which it multiplies"

(VII, p. 134).

New

model cars are poured out without consideration of the benefit of society
as a whole.

The unjust distribution of produce creates selfishness and

inequality, which in turn breed other evils:
To what but a cultivation of the mechanical arts in a degree
disproportioned to the presence of the creative faculty, which
is the basis of all knowledge, is to be attributed the abuse
of all invention for abridging and combining labour, to the
exasperation of the inequality of mankind?
From what other
cause has it arisen that these inventions which should have
lightened, have added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam?
(Defence, VII, p. 134)
Thus the imagination gap in man's reasoning resulted in the evils of the
Industrial Revolution.
The machine is something new to man.

Since its operation is not

instinctive to man's nature, he must learn from experience, observing
carefully the consequences of his actions.

After habitually perceiving

an action for a period of time he develops a feeling which helps him to
determine the relation between production and its effect.

This wisdom

20 Whyte, p. 116.
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gives foresight which guides his future actions.
Man has long held the belief that reason is the more useful faculty.
But Shelley debates this point in the De f e n c e .

When man considers the

value of anything he usually refers to utilitarian purposes,

thinking

only in terms of the limited sense of what is useful in order to satisfy
his animal nature.

The imagination creates all of man's ideas; reason

only considers those which can be subservient to his needs, without
accommodating the idea to man's inner

nature.

The imagination shows the

most useful habits man can follow in accommodating the invention to his
needs.

We have to know where we have been before we know where we are

going and only the imagination can efficiently determine this.
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CHAPTER V

THE PERPETUATION OF EVIL

'

The tyranny of signs over the mind of man perpetuates the evil which
infects society.

Names such as "KING" and "PRIEST" are the "sperm/ Of

what makes life foul, cankerous, and abhorred . . . "
11. 222-223).

("Ode to Liberty,"

Shelley wonders why man does not rise up and throw down

the symbols of power.
Oh that the free would stamp the impious name
Of KING into the dust . . . .
. . . Lift the victory-flashing sword,
And cut the snaky knots of this foul gordian word . . . .
("Ode to Liberty," 11. 211-218)
S helley’s poetry and prose continually exhort man to throw down signs and
regain imaginative freedom:

"This need not be; ye might arise, and will/

That gold should lose its power, and thrones their glory"

(The Revolt of

I s l a m , VIII, xvi, 11. 3334-3335).
Words which represent different habits of action decay in value, a
process Shelley describes in the D e f e n c e :
[The language of a poet is] vitally metaphorical; that is, it
marks the before unapprehended relations of things and per
petuates their apprehension, until the words which represent
them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of.
thoughts, instead of pictures of integral thoughts; and then
if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations
which have been thus disorganised, language will be dead to
all the nobler purposes of human intercourse.
(VII, p. Ill)
The word, "aristocracy," represents one such decay in value.

Shelley

points out in A Philosophical View of Reform that the word no longer has
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its original meaning;
Since usage has consecrated the distinction of the word aris
tocracy from its original meaning . . . , Let me be assumed
to employ the word aristocracy in that ordinary sense which
signifies that class of persons who possess a right to the
produce of the labour of others, without dedicating to the
common service any labour in return, (VII, p. 27)
Once man forgets the qualitative value of habits and words, he has
only a collection of "facts," gordian knots which entangle the mind.

The

poetry, the expression of man's imagination, is drained out of science,
politics and religion, and they become "Signs of thought's empire over
thought . . . "

(The Triumph of L i f e , 1. 211).

This is the imagination

gap which Shelley pictures in the D e f e n c e :
. . . The presence or absence of poetry in its most poetic and
universal form, has been found to be connected with good and
evil in conduct and habit. (VII, pp. 120-121)
According to "Speculations on Morals," "much of the confusion which has
involved the theory of morals" has been caused by a "common sophism,
which, like many others, depends upon the abuse of a metaphorical ex
pression to a literal purpose"

(VII, p. 74).

When man submits to an external order which no longer accommodates
the internal, he is prone to commit error.

The surface of society, how-

i

ever, is so overspread with the veil of familiarity that, although man
may try to think freely, he is so enmeshed in error that he is unable to
see what is truth, a problem which "Speculations on Morals" points out:
Almost all that which is ostensible submits to that legisla
ture created by the general representation of the past feelings
of mankind— imperfect as it is from a variety of causes, as
it exists in the government, the religion, and domestic habits.
Those who do not nominally, yet actually, submit to the same
power.
The external features of their conduct, indeed, can
no more escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream
of the wind; and his opinion, which he often hopes he has
dispassionately secured from all contagion of prejudice and
vulgarity, would be found, on examination, to be the inevitable
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excrescence of the very usages from which he vehemently dis
sents.
(.VII, pp. 82-83)
Even a poet in the "intervals of inspiration . . . becomes a man, and is
abandoned to the sudden reflux of the influence under which others habi
tually live"

(Defence, VII, p. 137).

From the moment of his birth, man learns to fit into the moulds of
society:

"The little Actor cons another part."

he agreed in necessity.

Man learns to act as if

This belief is most beneficial in man's relation

to the physical universe; he sets his alarm clock in expectation that the
sun will rise on the morrow; but its effect is most pernicious in rela
tion to morals.

Having lost his intense apprehension of reality, his

spontaneity, he accepts all of his various passions, such as "revenge,"
in their adulterated form.

His habit of mind prevents him from question

ing the intrinsic value of his habits and such things as kings, priests,
and money.

Trained as a soldier, he marches to war, loses a limb, and

proudly wears his badges.

A Philosophical View of Reform refers to war

as a "kind of superstition; the pageantry of arms and badges corrupts
the imagination of men"

(VII, p. 53).

Dickens in Hard Times laments the lack of poetry in industrialized
!

Victorian England.

The hard philosophy of utilitarianism demands that

one remake himself to fit the Procrustean bed of facts.

Sissy Jupe, who

lives with horses, is unable to define one when called upon to do so by
Gradgrind.

For her, the qualitative aspect of horses which she knows

intimately is inexpressible,.

Bitzer, Gradgrind's model pupil who has

been successfully filled to the brim with facts, easily pours out a des
cription:
Quadruped.
Gramnivorous. Forty teeth, namely,
grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive.

twenty-four
Sheds coat in
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the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too.
Hoofs
hard, but requiring to be shod with iron.
Age known by marks
in mouth.
Dickens exposes the evil of a strict utilitarianism which refuses to ac
cept the qualitative e l e ment•of reality and which attempts to define
reality in terms of what can be weighed and measured.
Even the doctrines of Christ, as the Defence indicates, become evil
when man forgets their qualitative value:
Whatever of evil [the Christian doctrines] may have contained
sprang from the extinction of the poetic principle, connected
with the progress of despotism and superstition.
(VII, p. 126)
Shelley reminds the reader in A Philosophical View of Reform that a
reading of the New Testament will expose the erroneous excesses of the
established churches:
The New Testament is in everybody's hand, and the few who
ever read it with the simple sincerity of an unbiassed judg
ment may perceive how distinct from the opinions of any of
those professing themselves establishers were the doctrines
and the actions of Jesus Christ. (VII, p. 8)
The test of an unbiased reading of the New Testament,

Shelley goes on to

say, was made during the Reformation and the "then existing hierarchy"
was found wanting.

"Ode to Liberty" also refers to this event:

Luther caught thy wakening glance;
Like lightning, from his leaden lance
Reflected, it dissolved the visions of the trance
In which, as in a tomb, the nations lay . . . .
(11. 141-144)
The "poetry" in the New Testament recalls man to the original rhythm and
order of Christianity.
Shelley applauds Berkeley and Hume in A Philosophical View of Reform
because they
have clearly established the certainty of our ignorance with
respect to those obscure questions which under the name of
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religious truths have been the watchwords of contention and
the symbols of unjust power ever since they were distorted by
the narrow passions of the immediate followers of Jesus from
that meaning to which philosophers are even now restoring
them. (VII, p. 9)
The chief role of philosophers, defined in "On Life," is to reduce the
"mind to that freedom in which it would have acted, but for the misuse
of words and signs, the instruments of its own creation (VI, p. 195).
"Speculations on Morals" also suggests a similar role:
The misguided imaginations of men have rendered the as
certaining of what is^ not t r u e , the principle direct service
which metaphysical enquiry can bestow upon moral science.
Moral science itself is the doctrine of the voluntary actions
of man, as a sentient and social being.
These actions depend
on the thoughts in his mind.
But there is a mass of popular
opinion, from which the most enlightened persons are seldom
wholly free, into the truth or falsehood of which it is en
cumbent on us to enquire before we can arrive at any firm
conclusions as to the conduct which we ought to pursue in the
regulation of our own minds, or towards our fellow-beings; or
before we can ascertain the elementary laws, according to
which these thoughts, from which these actions flow, are
originally combined. (VII, p. 71)
Shelley has the
for expression.

The

usual poet's plaint about the

inadequacy

of words

Defence recognizes, however, that language is su

perior to other forms of expression, for

it

has relation to
thoughts alone; but all other materials, in
struments, and conditions of art, have relations among each
other, which limit and interpose between conception and ex
pression. (VII, p. 113)
But some thoughts are too profound for expression.

As the "mind in

creation is as a fading coal" (Defence, .VII, p. 135), our consciousness
is unable to conceive of an idea created by the imagination in its full
light; the passage from "passive perception to voluntary contemplation"
is too steep

("Speculations on Metaphysics," VII, p. 64).

In Revolt of

I s l a m , Shelley finds one such conception beyond the power of words;
Like what may be conceived of this vast dome,
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When from the depths which, thought can seldom pierce
Genius beholds it rise, his native home,
Girt by the deserts of the Universe;
Yet, nor in p a i nting’s light, or mightier verse,
Or sculpture’s marble language, can invest
That shape to mortal sense— such glooms immerse
That incommunicable sight, and rest
Upon the labouring brain and overburdened breast.
(I, L, 11. 568-576)
In "Ode to Liberty," Shelley wishes that the veil drawn by words
would vanish:
Oh, that the words which make the thoughts obscure
From which they spring, as clouds of glimmering dew
From a white lake blot H e a v e n ’s blue portraiture,
Were stripped of their thin masks and various hue
And frowns and smiles and splendours not their own,
Till in the nakedness of false and true
They stand before their Lord, each to receive its due . . . .
(11. 234-240)
Unlike most poets, however, Shelley foresees a time when words will no
longer slide, crack, break or decay under tension.

When man finally

"falls" from evil into a state of grace, the event Prometheus Unbound
describes, he will command the universe and language will also come
under his control:

i

. . . Language is a perpetual Orphic song,
Which rules with Daedal harmony a throng
Of thoughts and forms, which else senseless and shapeless
were. (Prometheus Un b o u n d , IV, 11. 415-417)
Shelley prefers the model rather than the rule, for a metaphor

leaves the object intact for others to interpret.

Reason, attempting

to describe the action or thing itself, substitutes traits rather than
describing the appearance of the object.

Images, such as metaphors or

similes, do not violate the object, but leave it intact.
Poets recreate the world for man.

Their poetry

compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that
which we know.
It creates anew the universe, after it has
been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions
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blunted by reiteration.

(Defence, VII, p. 137)

Their language is "vitally metaphorical"'(Defence, VII, p. 111).

Instead

of describing the moon in quantitative terms, they attempt to describe
its qualities.
belled.

They do not attempt to name a thing, but leave it unla

Poets create afresh the associations of words by describing ob

jects with metaphors

(VII, p. Ill), an activity which the Defence states

is always necessary:
. . . If no new poets should arise to create afresh the asso
ciations which have been thus disorganised, language will be
dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse.
(VII, p. Ill)
Men of feeling have arisen throughout history to throw off the un
necessary yoke of familiarity.

Revolutions in Shelley's own day eviden

ced to him that man need not submit to oppressions he himself had crea
ted.

The 1820 revolution in Spain typically illustrated to Shelley man's

capacity to regain his freedom, and occasioned the writing of "Ode to
Liberty."

The ode records the physical and moral progress of man, begin

ning with the creation of the universe.

In it Shelley recalls the heights

and the abysses of man's moral history.
The liberty which Shelley refers to is a freedom to act out of "dis
interestedness" which, in "Speculations on Morals," he feels constitutes
"the majesty of our nature"

(VII, p. 76).

expresses a similar conception of liberty.

"On the Punishment of Death"
If man lives intensely in the

present, he will not distinguish between the future and the past.
imagination can then respond freely to events.

His

This is What distinguishes

philosophic necessity from, fatalism; and that determination of
the will, by which it is the active source of future events,
from that liberty or indifference, to which the abstract lia
bility of irremediable actions is attached, according to the
notions of the vulgar. ("On the Punishment of Death,
VI, p. 189)
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If m a n ’s imagination can respond freely, then poetry can come back into
his habits.
error.

The resultant intermixture of imagination and reason kills

"Ode to Liberty" urges Italy to "Gather thy blood into thy heart"

(1. 209) in order to free herself from tyranny.

Yeats, in "Easter, 1916,"

likewise observes that evil results when man loses his imaginative res
ponse to events.

The hearts of the Irish patriots have become stone

because of "Too long a sacrifice."

Moral progress results when liberty

is present for then the imaginative response is unbound.

The absence of

liberty causes evil, because of the unmitigated exercise of the calcula
ting faculty.
In Shelley's review of history,

it would seem difficult to distin

guish events which exemplify creations of the poetic faculty from those
of reason.

But actions of men which are not fixed in space and time are

expressions of the imagination.

The order reflected in these creations,

according to the D e f e n c e , is eternal, a "creation of actions according to
the unchangeable forms of human nature"

(VII, p. 115).

It is in this

sense that the doctrines of Christ, discussed earlier, and all great crea
tions of poetry, are eternal.

They reflect a rhythm and order which will

fqrever be true of relations between men.

For this reason, the Defence

states that the epics of Homer are eternal:
Homer embodied the ideal perfection of his age in human char
acter . . . .
The truth and beauty of friendship, patriotism,
and persevering devotion to an object, were unveiled to their
depths in these immortal creations . . . . (VII, p. 116)
Reason, we learn from the Defence,

is operative only in space and

time and is relevant to a "certain combination of events which can never
again recur"

(VII, p. 115).

Moral progress results only when man rises

above the temptations of the temporal order; he must not submit to ex
ternal necessity.

As the imagination acts unconsciously, man is unable
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to predict its operation.

Its influence

the veil of familiarity from his actions.

can come at any time to lift
The Defence thus notes sever

al acts of the Romans as being direct expressions of the imagination:
The life of Camillus, the death of Regulus; the expectations
of the Senators, in their godlike state, of the victorious
Gauls; the refusal of the Cannae, were not the consequences
of a refined calculation of the probable personal advantage
to result from such a rhythm and order in the shews of life,
to those who were at once the poets and the actors of these
immortal dramas.
The imagination beholding the beauty of this
order, created it out of itself according to its own idea;
the consequence was empire, and the reward ever-living fame.
(VII, p. 125)
Thus, in the "Ode to Liberty," habits of action due to the imagination
are distinguished from those of the reason by their universal or partial
nature.

When "Ode to Liberty"

begins, the earth is a "chaos and a curse"

(1. 22), for liberty is not in existence.
worst producing worst"

(1. 23).

Instead, there is "power from

In the origins of civilization,

the

instincts which are part of man's solitary, and thus selfish, nature
determine his actions.

Beasts warred on beasts, worms on worms, and

men on men, because "each heart was as a hell of storms"

(1. 30).

The

effects of nature are harmful in some instances, because man is a social
animal.

The influence of the imagination and reason tempers his heart,

but a harmony in social relations must develop first to free him.

Li

berty is a state of mind and does not come until the imagination has
been cultivated to the point where it can lift man out of his savagery.
Later, when man's reason becomes the dominant power, he is bound to a
necessity of a different kind.

The god in man or the animal can equally

devour the other.
As long as the components of man's nature

(his reason,

imagination
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and senses) are dissociated, he is subject to error.

The reason, unable

to recall all the ideas associated with an event, fits Promethean ideas
into Procrustean beds.

The independent activity of the imagination,

fancy, produces fictions.

An object presented to the memory or senses

properly activates the imagination.

Attempting to satisfy his senses,

man is no better off than in his original solitary state.

Unable to

properly fit means to ends, he may cause pain to others and his own gra
tification may only be a partial one.

Moral progress takes place only

when his instincts are integrated with his reason and when he develops
his knowledge of human nature and of social relations.
are possible with the cultivation of the imagination.

These developments
A

harmony among

these three powers and a resultant progression in morals is achieved
through love, the force which cultivates the imagination.
"A Discourse on the Manners of the Ancients," states that there must
be a balance among the powers of man; an imbalance in any one direction
produces evil:
. . . Love . . '. is the universal thirst for a communion not
merely of the senses, but of our whole nature, intellectual,
imaginative and sensitive; and which, when individualized,
becomes an imperious necessity, only to be satisfied by the
complete or partial, actual or supposed, fulfilment of its
claims.
(VII, p. 228)
When man is no longer determined by necessity, whether sensual or ra
tional, he is free and his imaginative response is unhampered.
«

The imagination keeps the proper balance between the reason and
the instincts.
rational power.

In this sense, the imagination may be defined as a bioIt does not unify the human psyche, but the entire man.

The archetypes in m a n ’s mind need the instincts to realize them.
imagination is destroyed in man, man is destroyed.
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The cultivation of the "social sympathies" takes time.

During the

formation of early civilizations, such as the Egyptian, man was "savage,
cunning, blind, and rude"

(1. 37); liberty still did not exist.

"For

thou wert not," which Shelley repeats in line eight of both stanzas two
and three, becomes a kind of refrain emphasizing the fact that man is
still a victim of change and his own passions.
Lines 46-50 suggest the harmonizing effect of nature, a power which
Shelley also describes in "On L o v e " :
Hence in solitude, or in that deserted state when we are sur
rounded by human beings, and yet they sympathise not with us,
we love the flowers, the grass, and the waters, and the sky.
In the motion of the very leaves of spring, in the blue air,
there is then found a secret correspondence with our heart.
There is eloquence in the tongueless wind, and a melody in
the flowing brooks and the rustling of the reeds beside them,
which by their inconceivable relation to something within
the soul, awaken the spirits to a dance of breathless rapture,
and bring tears of mysterious tenderness to the eyes, like the
enthusiasm of patriotic success, or the voice of one beloved
singing to you alone. (VI, p. 202)
Nature implants an instinct in man and, soon, his thoughts go along in
the same train as nature.

This harmony between man and nature accounts

for the sympathy that man feels for its objects.

Wordsworth notes a

similar effect of nature in Book One of The Prelude.

He claims that the

sound of the Derwent River, mixing with his nurse's songs, composed his
thoughts and gave him
Amid the fretful dwellings of mankind
A foretaste, a dim earnest, of the calm
That nature breathes among the hills and groves.
(11. 279-281)
Once man's thoughts are in tune with nature, his imagination begins
to play an active role; he develops foresight.

Shelley describes the

ocean waves, resounding in caves along the shores of Greece, as "prophe
tic echoes"

(1. 50).

Once man learns the harmonies in nature he is no
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longer its subject.
The Greeks, when first pictured by Shelley,, are unable to practice
husbandry:

"The vine, the corn, the olive mild,/ Grew savage yet, to

human use unreconciled . . . "
create Athens.

Athens,

"the will/ Of man"

(11. 52-53).

But soon they are able to

the first home of liberty, has been created by

(11. 70-71).

The organization of man's unconscious

storehouse has reached the point where his imaginative response can par
tially free him from error.
The Greeks immortalized their poetic creations in marble.

These

forms, along with the works of "bards and sages" (1. 80), serve as oracles
(1. 75) for liberty.

The ideal qualities of beauty, honour and courage

portrayed in Greek sculpture and verse can reawaken man's imagination in
times when these values decay.

The "earth awakening blast" of Grecian

art, like the original purity of Christian doctrines mentioned earlier,
exposes the corrupted character of religion and oppression, and rends
"the veil of space and time asunder"
Shelley recognizes Rome

(1. 86).

as the next home of liberty.

Rome is said

to feed on the milk of the "Elysian food" of Greece (11. 93-94).

The

Defence explains this, saying that the poetry of Rome is but a shadow of
the Grecian expression

(VII,

tain creations of the Romans

p. 125). But the Defence recognizes cer
as direct

expressions ofthe imagination:

The true poetry of Rome lived in its institutions; for what
ever of beautiful, true, and majestic, they contained, could
have sprung only from the faculty which creates the order in
which they consist. (VII, p. 125)
Acts of. heroism by Roman Senators, and such men as Camillus, Atilius and
Regulus, are also recognized

as direct

because they were performed out

expressions ofthe imagination

of disinterestedness; they were not a
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"refined calculation of the probable personal advantage to result from
such a rhythm and order in the shews of life" ('Defence,. VII, p. 125).
When man consciously tries to fit means to ends, he falls short of the
mark; "Expectation," a determination of the will by which it is the
active source of future events, cannot, as the "Ode to Liberty" points
out, fly where

Liberty soars

(11. 84-86).

Liberty leaves man when he forgets the metaphorical value of things:
" . . . When/ gold profaned thy Capitolian throne,/ Thou didst desert
(11. 99-101).

When man forgets the legitimate ends of gold, it becomes

an object pursued for its own sake.
slaves man.

. . ."

The quantitative value of gold en

Lacking any feeling for its qualitative value, he falls into

error.
Another sign that liberty has departed is the development of a dic
tatorship in Rome:

"The senate of the tyrants . . . sunk prone/ Slaves

of one tyrant . . . "

(11. 102-103).

When the original unity of thought

which makes up the customs and habits of the Roman institutions is for
gotten, certain offices come to stand for the whole.

Decay of the ori

ginal value of the institutions grows until axes and rods become signs and
symbols of power.

Stanza XV describes "KING" which Shelley here calls

a "foul gordian word" as
. . . weak itself as stubble, yet can bind
Into a mass, irrefragably firm,
The axes and the rods which awe mankind . . . .
(11. 219-221)
Evil comes upon men because their creations no longer contain the
poetical element,

Chaos and curse return to the earth and it becomes an

"undistinguishable heap"

(1, 120).

Liberty deserts for a thousand years,

from the time of Caesar through the dark ages.

Shelley refers to the
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Medieval Church as the ’’Galilean Serpent” which creeps forth "from its
sea of death, to kill and burn , , , ” (1. 118).

Meanwhile, Liberty,

in

exile, teaches the woods, waves and streams that "sublimest lore which
man had dared unlearn . , . " (1. 113).
)

Liberty returns with Alfred who brought peace to England and revived
learning.

His reign, the central period of Anglo-Saxon history, provided

sound policies and security for his successors.

Freedom from war and

strife gives man an opportunity to cultivate art and to enlarge and re
fine his sympathies.
The creation of city states restores peace in Italy.

The freedom

that m a n ’s spirit then gains makes possible the Renaissance and the
flourishing of the arts.

When man has freedom he can think, investigate

his own nature, and create new forms of expression.

He can also see the

incompatibility which exists between the old institutions and his inner
nature.

In times of oppression by government, war, and religion, man is

blinded and his moral progress is not only stunted, but regresses.
not free to rearrange the forms under which he lives.
shafts

[of Liberty] pierce tempest-wing'bd Error

. . . "

He is

But the "sunlight
(1. 138).

Luther's pen reflects this light of liberty (1. 142); applying the
test of the New Testament to the hierarchy of time by going back to the
original unity of Christian thought, he pointed out the discrepancies
between Christ's teaching and the superstructure of the Church.

Milton

also sees beyond the night in which man lives and his work serves to
awaken man from his trance.

The American and French revolutions are

also seen as the return of Liberty.
"Ode to Liberty" ends with an appeal to man to throw down the "im
pious name/ Of KING"

(11. 211-212) and the "pale name of PRIEST"
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Words, signs, and habits of action are merely arbitrary creations formed
at one time by the imagination.

They are suitable at a certain stage of

man's moral progress, but, now that their original purpose has been for
gotten, they should be discarded.

They no longer contain any poetry,

no intermixture of reason and imagination.

The consciousness, exercising

a tyranny over the unconscious, enslaves man.
The word, "PRIEST," should "shrink and dwindle/ Into the hell from
which it first was hurled"
heart.

(11. 228-229), that "hell" being the human

Man must return to the original purity of his poetic expressions;

he must cut down the "overgrowth of ages."

Shelley calls for a revival

of the intermixture of imagination and reason:
Oh, that the wise from their bright minds would kindle
Such lamps within the dome of this dim world,
That the pale name of PRIEST might shrink and dwindle . . . .
(11. 226-228)
Poets who expose this "over-growth" free man from the gordian knots
which entangle his mind.

Man then becomes the master of his own destiny:

He who taught man to vanquish whatsoever
Can be between the cradle and the grave
Crowned him the King of Life. (11. 241-243)
Shelley warns, in closing, that the efforts of the wise may be only
a "vain endeavour!/ If on his own high will, a willing slave,/
enthroned the oppression and the oppressor"
his own evil.

(11. 243-245).

[Man] has

Man creates

Liberty only exists when his mind has been conditioned

to the point where his imaginative response can free him from space and
time when he acts out of disinterested benevolence:
Blind Love, and equal Justice, and the Fame
Of what has been, the Hope of what will be?
0 Liberty! if such could be thy name
Wert thou disjoined from them, or they from thee . . . .
(11, 264-267)
The sonnet, "Political Greatness," points out that if man is to be master
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Man who man would be,
Must rule the empire of himself; in it
Must be supreme, establishing his throne
On vanquished will, quelling the anarchy
Of hopes and fears, being himself alone.
(11, 10-14)
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CHAPTER VI

LOVE AND THE FALL FROM EVIL
Shelley, in the tradition initiated by Shaftesbury, emphasizes
feeling rather than reason.

Feelings indicate man's state of well-being

in relation to the universe.

Man becomes aware of moral progress when

his pleasurable feelings become greater and more prolonged.

He prepares

the way for enlarging his sympathies when he investigates the forms under
which he lives and exposes any incompatibility between them and his n a 
ture.

There is a certain order or rhythm in life which Shelley calls the

beautiful and the true (Defence, VII, p. 111).

Man must consider his

own nature in any system devised to regulate society, for there is a
certain order or rhythm in his
pleasure.
from evil.

habits which affords him the greatest

The closer that he gets to this order, the freer he

will be

The Defence states that the "instrument" of moral progress

is the imagination and in the same passage we also learn that the great
secret of morals is love (VII,
The Defence explains that

p. 118).
love is a "going out of our own

nature,

and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in
thought, action, or person, not our own"
state of mind cultivates the imagination.

(VII, p. 118).

This empathic

By going out of his own nature

and referring "accents and gestures significant" of different feelings
to his own feelings, man becomes aware of the feelings of others.

He

learns to recognize natures similar to his own and to avoid pain and
promote pleasure,

53

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

54

Love opposes selfishness.

In his original solitary state, man is

unaware of the existence of other natures similar to his own.

His feelings

are circumscribed within a very small area and he is selfish.

The rea-

soner, who is the product of a civilization which has overgrown itself,
is also selfish, because his calculations, dissociated from imagination,
are narrow.

His world becomes more and more circumscribed as his values

continue to decay.

He acts to protect his own interests, benefiting an

inner circle, but forgets society as a whole.
ness of the feelings of others.

Man must regain his aware

Love, acting to cultivate the imagination,

brings the poetry back into human relations and lifts men "out of the
dull vapours of the little world of self"

(Defence, VII, p. 128).

Moral progress results when man intensely apprehends life.

He can

then see beyond the apparent uniformity and, thus, lift the veil of fa
miliarity.

Shelley warns in "Speculations on Morals" that no one action,

when considered in its entirety, is essentially similar to any other.
Mari must note the particular characteristics of each human action in
order for moral progress to take place;

!

It is in the due appreciating the general effects of their
peculiarities, and in cultivating the habit of acquiring
decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising out of
[them] in particular cases, that the most important part of
moral science consists. ("Speculations On Morals," VII, p. 82)
As man's imagination is more fully cultivated, he becomes more free

from error.

His nature becomes more fully integrated.

divided, love becomes an "imperious necessity."

If his nature is

Driven by his senses,

man may only achieve a partial satisfaction of his needs.("On Love," VII,
p. 228),

He develops his imagination fully by identifying with as many

other thoughts, actions, and persons as possible.

Epipsychidion

warns

that the man who has a limited imagination becomes trapped in time and
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falls into error;
Narrow
The heart, that loves, the brain that contemplates,
The life that wears, the spirit that creates
One object, and one form, and builds thereby
A sepulchre for its eternity.
(11. 169-173)
A few lines before this! passage,

Shelley, referring to the imagination's

power to dispel error, identifies love with the imagination:
Love is like understanding, that grows bright,
Gazing on many truths; 'tis like thy light,
Imagination! which from earth and sky,
And from the depths of human fantasy,
As from a thousand prisms and mirrors, fills
The Universe with glorious beams, and kills
Error, the worm, with many a sun-like arrow
Of its reverberated lightning. (11. 162-169)
The madman in Julian and Maddalo
tivate his imagination fully.

Julian

exemplifies man's failure to cul
suspects that a" ’want

of that

true

theory, still/ "Which seeks a "soul of goodness" in things ill/ Or in
himself or others

. . .

(11. 203-205) caused the madman's insanity.

The madman states that "'loathed scorn and

outrage unrelenting/ Met

excited by far other' seeming . . . '" (11.

333-334).

fallen in love, but was scorned.
equal.

If the madman

love

The madman had

The woman was not his sympathetic

had acquired more completely "decisive knowledge"

regarding the effects of particular actions, he could have avoided error.
He would have perceived that the woman would not harmonize with his nat

ture.
Both the Defence

(VII, p. 118) and "On the Manners of the Ancients"

(VII, p. 227) note that man's attitude toward love has changed through
the ages.

As love is more perfectly realized,

the imagination becomes

enlarged and refined, bringing about a resultant change in man's insti
tutions.

Both of the works cited above state that Greek civilization
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was founded upon an imperfection.
goes

As the "On the Manners

of the Ancients"

on to explain, the Greeks lacked the "legitimate object" of

mental love.

senti

Their institutions reflect this incomplete realization of

man's nature:
. . . All the virture and the wisdom of the Periclean age
arose under other institutions, in spite of the diminution
which personal slavery and the inferiority of women, recog
nised by law and opinion, must have produced in the delicacy,
the strength, the comprehensiveness, and the accuracy of their
conceptions, in moral, political, and metaphysical science,
and perhaps in every other art and science. (VII, p. 227)
Man's nature is quite complex, for his instincts are

highly refined.

"On the Manners of the Ancients" explains that man, even in his "wildest
state . . . [is]

...

a social being" (VII, p. 228).

"rhythm or order" in his habits peculiar to his nature.

There is a certain
"On the Manners

of the Ancients" states that man's instincts become "more intimate and
complete . . .

in proportion to the development which [his] nature re

ceives from civilisation . . . "

(VII, p. 228).

For example, the "An

cients" defines the sentiment of love as a "universal thirst" for a
"communion not merely of the senses, but of our whole nature, intellectual,
imaginative and sensitive . . . "
j

(VII, p. 228).

The essay, "On Love," defining love, indicates that man's instincts

are similar to an animal's and are not rationalistic archetypes.

They

also are present at birth:
We are born into the world, and there is something within us
which, from the instant that we live, more and more thirsts
after its likeness.
It is probably in correspondence with
this law that the infant drains milk from the bosom of its
mother; this propensity develops itself with the development
of our nature.
("On Love," VI, p. 201)

22 Shelley states in several places that an "instinct" in man de
termines his actions.
In an earlier draft of the De f e n c e , Shelley defines
the operation of the imagination as making an "instinctive adjustment" of
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This interpretation is similar to H u m e ls.

In An Enquiry Concerning Human

Understanding he states that instincts are innate;
It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to
secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or
mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations,
may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought,
and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the
understanding. (Enquiries, p. 55)
A few pages later in the E nquiry, we learn that the instinct in man is
similar to that in animals:
Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct,
which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which
teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation,
and the whole economy and order of its nursery.
(Enquiries, p. 108)
Therefore, although the Greeks lacked the "legitimate object" of senti
mental love, they still were fully capable of realizing it, for this
sympathy is an instinct which is part of man's nature.
"On the Manners of the Ancients" states that the natural attraction
for a man is a woman, but because of the way Greek society was established,
women were slaves and not on the same level as men.

The men could not

"sounds or motions . . . to . . . impressions" (VII, p. 352).
In the
same sentence he says that this "principle" is found "perhaps within all
sentient beings" (VII, p. 109).
In "On the Manners of the Ancients," a
passage pertinent to this problem adds some complication, for there are
two versions of it.
One, in an excerpt of the "Ancients" published by
Thomas Medwin in the Athenaeum for September 29, 1832, reads, "The mind
selects among those who most resemble it, that which is most its arche
type and instinctively fills up the interstices of the imperfect image .
. . " (VII, p. 362).
The other, published by Mary Shelley in 1840, reads,
"This object of sentimental love, or its archetype, forever exists in the
mind, which selects among those who resemble it, that which most resem
bles it; and instinctively etcJ' (VII, p. 228).
Notwithstanding Shelley's,
or Mary Shelley's, calling the instinct an "archetype," the important
distinction made is that the mind "instinctively" fills up the inter
stices of the imperfect image.
In Prometheus Unbound, after man's fall
into grace at the end of Act III, Shelley reaffirms man's animal nature:
" . . . man/ Passionless?— no, yet free from guilt or pain,/ Which were,
for his will made or suffered them . . . " (Ill, iv, 11. 197-199).
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find their equal, except in their own sex, but this does not represent
a full realization of man's nature.

Institutions are created by the

imagination, but since the imagination was not fully developed, neither
\

were the institutions.
Women have since become equal to men, and
to

their freedom, according

the D e f e n c e , "produced the poetry of sexual love"

(VII, p. 127).

Shelley does not know for sure what caused the emancipation of women, but
he suggests in the "Ancients," and the D efence, that it may
arise from some imperfect influence of the doctrines of Jesus
Christ, . . . or from the institutions of chivalry, or from
a certain fundamental difference of physical nature existing
in the Celts, or from a combination of all or any of these
causes, acting on each other . . . . (VII, p. 227)
Since modern Europeans have more fully realized their nature, their

ima

gination is more enlarged and refined and their institutions represent an
improvement over the Greek.

For Shelley, social progress is connected

with moral progress.
Man will free himself from evil altogether when his imagination is
fully cultivated.

Love, by cultivating the imagination, integrates rea

son and imagination; and man, contrarily to the Gnostic tradition of the
emanation and fall of creation, falls into grace.

There is a certain or

der in the "shews of life," according to the Defence, called the "true
and the beautiful"

(VII, p. 111).

When man's imagination is enlarged

and refined, he comes closer to experiencing the harmony which underlies
existence,

including social relations.

By the cultivation of the imagination lifting the veil of familiarity
from life, man reaches a truer integration of his personality.

He reali

zes a certain rhythm and order in his habits from which he derives an
intenser and purer pleasure.

As was pointed out, the Greek practice of
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love is irreconcilable to what Shelley feels mankind can attain:
This much is to be admitted that, represent this passion as
you will, there is something totally irreconcilable in its
cultivation to the beautiful order of social life, to an equal
participation in which all human beings have an indefeasible
claim and from which hal^of the human race by the Greek ar
rangement were excluded.
Poetry,

like love, also cultivates man's imagination.

It enlarges

and refines his sympathies with the ideal conceptions embodied in its
form.

These are ideas from which man,derives an intenser and purer plea

sure.

As man cultivates his imagination, he assimilates the "beautiful"

which he perceives and rejects imperfections, thus forming a miniature
within himself of ideal forms of conduct which forms a basis for judg
ment :
We dimly see within our intellectual nature a miniature as it
were of our entire self, yet deprived of all that we condemn
or despise, the ideal prototype of every thing excellent or
lovely that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the
nature of man.
Not only the portrait of our external being,
but an assemblage of the minutest particles of which our na
ture is composed; a mirror whose surface reflects only the
forms of purity and brightness; a soul within our soul that
describes a circle around its proper paradise, which pain, and ^
sorrow, and evil dare not overleap. ("On Love," VI, pp. 201-202)
With this more refined set of instincts which determines his will into

23 Percy Bysshe Shelley, "On the Manners of the Ancient Greeks," in
Shelley’s P r o s e : Or the Trumpet of a Proph e c y , ed. David L. Clark (New
Mexico, 1954), p. 223.

,

24 See Shelley's preface to "Alastor": "[The poet] images to himself
the Being whom he loves.
Conversant with speculations of the sublimest
and most perfect natures, the vision in which he embodies his own ima
ginations unites all of wonderful, or wise, or beautiful, which the
poet, the philosopher, or the lover could depicture.
The intellectual
faculties, the imagination, the functions of sense, have their respec
tive requisitions on the sympathy of corresponding powers in other human
beings.
The Poet is represented as uniting these requisitions, and at
taching them to a single image.
He seeks in vain for a prototype of his
conception."(I, p. 173)
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action, man feels a want in imperfect objects around him.

Thus, unlike

the solitary man, he is no longer subject to change:
. . . Poetry defeats the curse which binds us to be subjected
to the accident of surrounding impressions.
And whether it
spreads its own figured curtain, or withdraws life's dark
veil from before the scene of things, it equally creates for
us a being within our being.
It makes us the inhabitants of a
world to which the familiar world is a chaos.
(Defence, VII, p. 137)
The ideal prototype, the refined sympathies, within man impels him,
instinctively,

to search for his antitype.

A person whose sympathies

are highly refined may find a society which is incapable of response:
Hence in solitude, or in that deserted state when we are sur
rounded by human beings, and yet they sympathise not with-us,
we love the flowers, the grass, and the waters, and the sky.
. . . Sterne says that, if he were in a desert, he would love .
some cypress.
So soon as this want or power is dead, man be
comes the living sepulchre of himself, and what yet survives
is the mere husk of what once he was. ("On Love," VI, p. 202)
We learn in Prometheus Unbound that love must be "given and returned" if
"evil and error" are to fall (II, v, 11. 39-40 and III, iii, 11. 5 9 - 6 2 ) . ^
If man does not find his antitype, other natures which have refined sym
pathies similar to his, his imaginative response becomes dulled and then
is extinguished.

"Alastor"

records such a failure, but in

Epipsychidion,

Shelley finds his antitype in Emily Viviani.
Although the order and
improvement over the Greek,

rhythm of modern European life represent
Shelley does not

an .

know what the ultimate

25 Milton, in Paradise L o s t , also says that love must be given and
returned.
Adam senses a want in the forms of creation surrounding him.
Man can only obtain a sense of satisfaction with his antitype, a creature
with sympathies refined to a pitch similar to his own:
Among unequals what society
Can sort, what harmony, or true delight?
Which must be mutual, in proportion due
Given and received; but in disparity,
The one intense, the other still remiss,
Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove
Tedious alike. (Book VIII, 11. 383-389)
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perfection of man eventually will be,

"On the Manners of the Ancients"

states that there is room for further refinement;
The practices and customs of modern Europe are essentially
different from and incomparably less pernicious than either,
however remote from what an enlightened mind cannot fail to
desire as the future destiny of human beings. (VII, p. 229)
The ultimate point, of man's moral progress will be reached when his
feelings become awakened to those of all mankind, both in the present and
the past.

When man can conceive of an infinite number of thoughts in a

minute, time stops; he is at the still point of the turning world.

Shel

ley, at least at the time of the composition of Queen M a b , believes that
man's sensibility is perfectible:
If, therefore, the human mind, by any future improvement of its
sensibility, should become conscious of an infinite number of
ideas in a minute, that minute would be eternity.
I do not
hence infer that the actual space between the birth and death
of a man will ever be prolonged; but that his sensibility is
perfectible, and that the number of ideas which his tgjnd is
capable of receiving is indefinite. (I, pp. 156-157)
Shelley, in that work, also believed that love freed man from evil:

1
'

Dark flood of time!
Roll as it listeth thee— I measure not
By months or moments thy ambiguous course,
Another may stand by me on the brink
And watch the bubble whirled beyond his ken
That pauses at my feet.
The sense of love
The thirst for action, and the impassioned thought
Prolong my being . . . . (I, p. 157)
Prometheus in Prometheus Unbound represents man who has this highly

cultivated imagination.

He is

the type of the highest perfection of moral and intellectual

26 Compare:
As the poet in "Alastor" has cultivated his imagination
to this point, he is isolated; he cannot find his prototype in a world
defined by space and time:
The fountains of divine philosophy
Pled not his thirsting lips, and all of great,
Or good, or lovely, which the sacred past
In truth or fable consecrates, he felt
And knew. ("Alastor," 11. 71-75)
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nature, impelled by the purest and the truest motives to the
best and noblest end. (Prometheus U nbound, Shelley's Preface,
II, p. 172)
His name signifies forethought, as that of his brother, Epimetheus, sig
nifies afterthought.

As afterthought, or reason, is a conscious power,

its predictions are limited.

Forethought, the imagination, has command

over all its ideas and is thus more efficient than reason.

Prometheus

Unbound, an allegory, describes the conflict within man between his rea
son and his imagination.

I would like to discuss the play briefly to

summarize some of the ideas contained in my thesis.
The fact that Prometheus has been chained to a rock by Jupiter and
tortured for the past 3,000 years is a paradoxical situation because it
was Prometheus who gave Jupiter his power:
dom, which is strength,
(II, iv, 11. 43-49).

to Jupiter,/

"Then Prometheus/ Gave wis

. . . And Jove now reigned . . .

11

Prometheus, because of his imaginative capacity,

is a poet, the man best suited to see what form of civil habits would
best benefit man.
his life.

Man adopts the forms which the poet creates to govern

"[Reasoners] follow the footsteps of poets, and copy the

sketches of their creations into the book of common life"
p. 132).

(Defence, VII,

Jupiter is a creation of Prometheus designed to govern the

affairs of men.
The only restriction which Prometheus places on Jupiter is, "Let
man be free"

(II, iv, 1. 45).

If Jupiter maintains the metaphorical

nature of his office, man will continue to realize that he is only an
invention, a conception which is representative of an idea.
man's imaginative capacity free to develop.

This leaves

By the same token, man is

also free to rearrange and readjust Jupiter's relationship to fit his
changing powers.

In the ideal sense, democracy is a form of government
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which can be changed to fit the needs of the people.

When Jupiter

becomes an absolute, m a n ’s imagination becomes blunted and his foresight
deficient.

In the telescoped action of the play, misery befalls man as

soon as reason reigns:
. . . And Jove now reigned; for on the race of man
First famine, and then toil, and then disease,
Strife, wounds, and ghastly death unseen before,
Fell . . . . (II, iv, 11. 49-52)
Prometheus hates and curses Jupiter for chaining him to the rock.
He forgets that Jupiter is his own invention and commits the greatest
folly of man, to curse that which he has invented.

A change i n ’the moral

action of the poem occurs when suffering brings wisdom to Prometheus:
I speak in grief,
Not exultation, for I hate no more,
As then ere misery made me wise. (I, 11. 56-58)
Prometheus no longer hates Jupiter, but now pities him.

As soon as he

pities Jupiter, he is identifying with him, an act which is akin to love.
Since hatred is an active determination of the will, Prometheus'
ness would exercise a tyranny over his unconscious.
again becomes capable of an imaginative response.

conscious

Through pity, he
Since Prometheus re

presents the highest perfection of the imaginative powers, he is now
able to perceive Jupiter's imperfect nature.

He can see Jupiter as a

creation which falls short of the ideal perfection within himself.
When Prometheus regains his imaginative powers he becomes free from
space and time.

By his intense apprehension of the present and a resul

tant imaginative response, he is able to determine by feeling that Jupi
ter is not eternal,
in space and time.
holds from Jupiter.

Jupiter has become absolute and, thus, is trapped
This seems to be the secret which Prometheus with
Prometheus also realizes that there is no reason to
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be in awe of this fabrication.
Throughout his imprisonment, Jupiter sends Furies to torture Pro
metheus.
The
The
The
And

They show him visions of the confusion among men:
good want power, but to weep barren tears.'
powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
wise want love; and those who love want wisdom;
all best things are thus confused to ill.
(I, 11. 625-628)

Prometheus, who has regained his imaginative powers, is able to see the
true nature of these actions:

'"I close my tearless eyes, but see more

clear/ Thy works within my woe-illumed mind,/ Thou subtle tyrant'"
636-638).

(I, li.

Because Prometheus has felt the imperfect nature of Jupiter,

the visions no longer torture him.

He realizes that the evil actions

are the fruits of a tree which is not rooted in eternity and they streng
then his conviction that Jupiter's reign is to be short-lived.
The sights with which thou torturest gird my soul
With new endurance, till the hour arrives
When they shall be no types of things which are.
(I, 11. 643-645)
Jupiter's throne is built on fear and tradition (III, i, 1. 10).

In

order to secure his power he has begotten a "fatal child" intended to
stamp out the last spark in man, a final misery to extinguish man's
hope

(III, i, 11. 18-24).

If man continues to acquiesce in the forms

which weaken his spirit, he may eventually lose any chance of regenera
tion.

Man who is in' time and space must preserve his spontaneity, or be

ever subject to time.
The "fatal child," however, turns out to be Demogorgon, who calls
himself, "Eternity"

(III, i, 1. 52).

Jupiter, who has become an absolute

power and fixed in space and time, is unable to endure Eternity.
tained in any absolute is the seed of its eventual destruction.

Con
"The

future is contained within the present as the plant within the seed"
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(Defence, V I I , p. 110).
Prometheus is released from the rock and reunited with Asia who re-^
presents- love.

The significance of this union is the fact that the ima

gination has to be united with love if there is to be moral progress.
Man has to fill up his imagination gap.

Together love and wisdom can

create a new order and the regeneration of man.

Love turns the mind in

the direction in which the imagination can be operative.

R e p ro d u c e d w ith p erm is sio n o f th e co p yrig h t o w n e r. F u rth e r re p ro d u ctio n p ro hib ited w ith o u t p erm is sio n .

conclusion

S helley’s ambition as a philosopher needs to Be appreciated when
reading his poetry.

The Best approach Is to read his prose before, or

along with, his poetry,

Shelley’s own intention during his early career

was to Become a philosopher, and at one point he felt impelled to choose
between that and poetry.
this ambition.

He wrote several works in an attempt to realize

Two early essays, "Speculations on Metaphysics" and "Spe

culations on Morals," were intended as complete philosophical treatises.
A Philosophical View of Reform and A. Defence of Poetry evidence his con
tinuing interest in this pursuit and amply demonstrate his ability.

A

Defence of Poetry was to contain three parts, the second to be "an appli
cation of these principles

[°f poetry] to the present state of the culti

vation of Poetry, and a defence of the attempt to idealize the modern
forms of manners and opinions, and compel them into a subordination to
the imaginative and creative faculty"

(Defence, VII, p. 140).

The fully

developed Defence was to show the relation between a system of philoso
phy, a theory of poetry, and a theory of society.
Shelley seems to respect only a philosophy which is grounded on a
stable basis and his works reflect his sceptical approach.

Although his

system represents a synthesis of many views, he emphasizes the British
empiricists, and, especially, Hume,

Hume gives a more satisfying ex

planation of the nature of man and his relation to the universe, a pro
blem which. Shelley regards as m o r e psychological than philosophical.
Following Hume, Shelley- emphasizes the importance of the imagination,
As a kind of associative response, representing an accumulation of all of
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man*s former experiences, Shelley recognizes its authority oyer the r^a^
son,

He considers the imagination as- closer to reality, for, when it is

activated by some event in nature or society, its creations are in har^
mony w i t h the course of nature or society.

Because of t h i s , Shelley

argues that poetry, the ^expression of the imagination" (Defence, V I I ,
p, 109), should form the basis for regulating the affairs of men,

Man

determines the moral character of his ideas by the feeling, whether
painful or pleasurable, w h i c h accompanies the activity of his imagina
tion,

But the reason, lacking this qualifying basis, leads man further

and further away from a harmonious existence.
Readers of Shelley's poetry usually criticize his emphasis on ab
stractions and his didacticism,
sence of either.
as he feels it.

Shelley, I think, would deny the pre

Rather than being abstract, Shelley is defining reality
It is we who live in a world of abstractions.

Shelley

would refute the charge of didacticism which Eliot, for example, finds
obtrusive in the poetry by answering that he is only fulfilling his role
as a poet.

Poets bring down "light and fire from , . . eternal regions"

(Defence, VII, p. 135).
reflection of reality.

This truth can only be contained in poetry, the
If we fail to realize that Shelley is not spea

king in mere abstractions and not being didactic, we miss the truth that
lies in the poetry.

What Eliot terms philosophic theory is the truth

that Shelley is communicating.

By labelling Shelley as abstract or

didactic, w e are assuming that our view of life defines reality.

Shelley

realizes that society can be freed from error and evil only by poetry
which is not an abstraction.
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